SSIA'S PART 

IN THE 

WORLD WAR 



3j> 
COLONEL C. M. SHUMSKY-SOLOMONOV 



PUBLISHED BY THE 

Russian Information Bureau in the U. S. 

WOOLWORTH BUILDING 
NEW YORK CITY 



RUSSIA'S PART 

IN THE 

WORLD WAR 



£v 



COLONEL C. M. SHUMSKY-SOLOMONOV 



PUBLISHED BY THE 

Russian Information Bureau in the U. S. 

WOOLWORTH BUILDING 

NEW YORK CITY 



Copyright 1920 

by 

Russian Information Bureau 

New York 



GMIt 

Publisher 

mn n t92o 



5 \A 



n* 



Introduction 



The author of this pamphlet, Colonel C. M. Shumsky-Solo- 
monov, is an officer of the Russian Army, a distinguished 
soldier and an authority on military problems. Col. Shumsky- 
Solomonov was one of the defenders of Port Arthur during 
the Russo-Japanese War, and as a military expert of the 
Petrograd daily, "Birjeviya Viedomosti", he was well known not 
only in Russia but also throughout Europe. 

The purpose of this pamphlet is to present Russia's part in 
the recent War. Russia at present lies in seas of blood and 
tears because of her enormous sacrifices in the struggle against 
Prussian militarism. The nightmare of Bolshevism was able to 
overtake Russia because she was exhausted by three years of 
active participation in the War, during which her casualties 
reached 12,000,000, and her economic life became overstrained 
and partially destroyed. Russia's present pitiful condition is the 
result of her self-sacrificing services to humanity. 

According to the data quoted by Col. Shumsky-Solomonov, of 
the 12,000,000 Russian casualties in the recent War, not less than 
3,000,000 were in dead. "Russia's losses," says Col. Shumsky- 
Solomonov, "are more than twice those of France, four-five times 
those of England, and more than thirty-five times those of 
America. Russia's losses are more than twice the total strength 
of the British Army, and three-four times all the forces mustered 
by the United States. The number of Russia's casualties is 
larger than the total population of any of the following European 
countries : Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Portugal, Belgium, 
Holland or the Balkan States." 

If Russia had not sacrificed 3,000,000 of her best youth, now 
sleeping on the battle-fields of Europe, a Prussian bayonet would 
now be ruling the world. As Col. Shumsky-Solomonov points 
out, the great role played by Russia in the recent struggle "be- 
came apparent at the very beginning of the War, in the important 
aid she rendered in frustrating the initial and most dangerous 



plan of the Germans, by her early offensive in aid of the Allies. 
Russia, having diverted against herself the entire Austrian 
army and part of the German, at the time of the battle on 
the Marne, through her offensive in East Prussia and Galicia, 
deprived the enemy of the opportunity to realize the funda- 
mental idea of Moltke's plan to fling 'all forces into France.' " 

"At the following attempt of the enemy to find a decision in 
France, to break through to Calais, at Ypres," says Col. Shum- 
sky-Solomonov, "Russia, by the blows she delivered in Galicia, at 
Warsaw and in East Prussia, contributed to the early termina- 
tion of this second offensive in France, so dangerous to England, 
and compelled the Germans for more than a year to abstain from 
their main operations on the main decisive front of the War — in 
France. 

"In 1915 Russia, having shouldered alone the whole bur- 
den of the struggle against Germany, Austria and Turkey, 
although forced to abandon Poland, still gave the Allies the 
opportunity to prepare throughout a whole year for the 
coming German offensive at Verdun. In 1916 Russia, thanks to 
the Brusilov offensive, saved Italy at that critical moment when 
the Austrians, through their successful offensive from Tyrol, in 
the rear of the Italians, threatened to cut off a considerable por- 
tion of the Italian Army, at the same time menacing Venice. To- 
gether with this, Russia by this offensive greatly facilitated the 
operations of the Allies on the Somme, and was instrumental 
in the final clearing of the Verdun forts. 

"In the same year Russia took upon herself the blows of Mack- 
ensen's and Falkenhayn's armies, which had invaded Roumania, 
stopped the further advance of the Germans, and undertook 
the defense of a considerable stretch of the Roumanian front." 

In the beginning of the War, in August, 1914, there were, in 
addition to the Austrian Army, only 14 German divisions engaged 
on the Russian front. During the first Russian advance into 
Eastern Prussia, the German General Staff was obliged, on the 
eve of the battle of the Marne, to transfer 6 additional divisions 
to the Eastern front. The number of German divisions engaged 
on the Russian front grew continuously, and in October, 1914, 
there were 25 divisions, in November — 33 divisions, in Decem- 
ber — 43 divisions, and in January, 1915, — 53 German divisions on 



the Russian front. The role played by Russia and the services 
the Russian Armies rendered in the struggle against Prussian 
Imperialism can be seen further from the fact that during the 
spring of 1917 there were 162 German and Austrian divisions 
engaged on the Russian front alone, while on all the other Allied 
fronts together there were 205 German and Austrian divisions.* 

To this it must be added that Russia entered the War unpre- 
pared for a modern struggle. As Col. Shumsky-Solomonov 
points out, "The Russian Army consisted of millions, but bayonets 
and guns it had only for one-tenth of its number." General 
Brusilov once said: "Our soldiers had no shells with which to 
blast their way across barbed-wire entanglements before an at- 
tack ; so it was necessary for them to break down the wires with 
their own bodies and thus to form a bridge for the next attack- 
ing column." In the fall of 1917 the Russian Armies collapsed 
after months of intensive German and Bolshevist propaganda, 
but this cannot minimize the great heroism of the Russian soldiers 
during the first three years of the War, heroism without which 
the alliance of the democratic nations would never have been able 
to defeat the Prussian militarism. 

A. J. SACK 
Director of the Russian Information 
Bureau in the U. S. 

May 25, 1920. 



*See diagrams on pp. 15 and 18 



Russia's Part in the 
World War 



Was it Possible for Germany to Win the War? 

In discussing Russia's role in the past World War, it is cus- 
tomary to cite the losses sustained by the Russian Army, losses 
numbering many millions. There is no doubt that Russia's sac- 
rifices were great, and it is just as true that her losses were 
greater than those sustained by any of the other Allies. Never- 
theless, these sacrifices are by far not the only standard of meas- 
urement of Russia's participation in this gigantic struggle. Rus- 
sia's role must be gauged, first of all, by the efforts made by the 
Russian Army to blast the German war plans during the first 
years of the War, when neither America, nor Italy, nor Rou- 
mania were among the belligerents, and the British Army was 
still in the process of formation. 

Russia's role must in addition be gauged by the efforts put 
forth by the Russian Army to save the situation at other critical 
moments of the War. And of such, we know, there were not a 
few until the Allies succeeded in gaining their victory over the 
stubborn and powerful enemy. 

Lastly, and this is the main thing, the role played by the Rus- 
sian Army must be considered also in this respect that the strenu- 
ous campaign waged by Russia, with her 180 millions of inhabi- 
tants, for three years against Germany, Austro-Hungary and 
Turkey, sapped the resources of the enemy and thereby 
made possible the delivery of the final blow. This weaken- 
ing of the powers of the enemy by Russia was already 
bound at various stages of the War to facilitate correspond- 
ingly the various operations of the Allies. Therefore at the 
end of the War three years of effort on the pa,rt of Russia, 
which had devoured the enemy's forces, were destined to 
enable the Allies finally to crush the enemy. The final 



8 Russia's Part in the World War 

catastrophe of the Central Powers was the direct consequence 
of the offensive of the Allies in 1918, but Russia made 
possible this collapse to a considerable degree, having 
effected, in common with the others, the weakening of Ger- 
many, and having consumed during the three years of strenu- 
ous fighting countless reserves, forces and resources of the 
Central Powers. 

Could Germany have won the war? A careful analysis of this 
question brings home the conviction that Germany was very close 
to victory, and that it required unusual straining of efforts on the 
part of France and Russia to prevent Germany from "winning 
out." 

The plan of the old Field Marshal, Moltke, was far from worth- 
less. It is a fact that it took from six weeks to two months to 
mobilize the armed forces of Russia, during which period Russia 
was unprepared for action. The population of Germany was 70 
million and that of Austria-Hungary 52 million, a total of 122 
million persons. During these two months of forced inaction 
those 122 millions of Teutons were faced only by 40 million 
Frenchmen, for Russia was not yet ready. A threefold superior- 
ity in numbers, in addition to an equal degree of military skill, 
technical equipment and culture, was bound to crush lone 
France. 

It is true that for the complete realization of this scheme it was 
necessary that the Austrian Army, as well, involve France. This 
should have been anticipated, as military science does not admit 
of the division of forces. Just to the contrary, it demands "the 
concentration of all forces in the decisive hour and at the decid- 
ing point," — in France, upon this particular occasion. 

It may be said that Russia could have occupied Galicia and 
East Prussia had the Austrian Army left for France. Well, 
the fact is that both these provinces were occupied by Russia 
anyhow. But if in the first battle of the Marne, when the Ger- 
mans felt the shortage of the two or three corps dispatched back 
into Prussia, they would have had these troops at their disposal in 
addition to half a million Austrians, Joffre's condition would 
have been rendered critical. The loss of the Marne would have 



Russia's Part in the World War 



been equivalent to the loss of the War by France, and, conse- 
quently, to the loss of the entire War. 

The outcome was different. The concentrated attack upon 
France failed because of the fact that of the 104 German divi- 
sions and the 50 Austrian divisions only about 92 or 94 divisions 
were on the scene of action in France. The Russian Army, un- 
prepared for action for another 40 days, nevertheless rushed into 
East Prussia in an impulse of self-sacrifice and received in addi- 
tion the full strength of the blow from the Austro-Hungarian 
Army. This generous move on the part of Russia destroyed the 
Moltke plan and his basic idea "the concentration of all forces 
against France", as a part of the German force had been diverted 
from that front. The plan collapsed, and the only actual chance 
which the Germans had of winning a victory was lost with it. 
Later, when Russia was prepared, when the English Army began 
to grow, and Italy, Roumania and America had abandoned their 
neutrality, Germany's chances for a final victory vanished. 

It is the recognition of these facts that should prompt every 
impartial historian of the War to admit that the self-sacrifice o! 
the unprepared Russian Army during the first days of the War 
played an enormous role in the only period when Germany had 
victory almost within her grasp. It is to be regretted that the 
extraordinary conditions which developed in Russia towards the 
end of the War are obscuring the true historic role of Russia in 
the sanguine World struggle. It is simple enough to understand 
that during the two or three years, while the British Army was 
still in the process of formation, and Italy, Roumania and America 
were neutral, the entire burden of fighting the Central Powers 
devolved upon the Armies of France and Russia. It is just a9 
simple to understand that during that period, when the enemy 
was most powerful and undemoralized, when he was operating 
with his best troops, that the most difficult and responsible part of 
the problem had to be performed. It is just as easy — from an 
examination of the maps of the first three years of the War, maps 
which speak only of two principal fronts, the French and the 
Russian, and no other — to grasp the significance of the gigantic 
role played in this War by great Russia and the millions of sacri- 



10 Russia's Part in the World War 

fices she consecrated to the common cause of the Allies. Sadly 
enough, this only correct criterion of Russia's historic role in 
the War is becoming more and more obscured from the public 
opinion of the world. 

In the recently published memoirs of General Ludendorf, the 
defeated German military leader, in an endeavor to clear him- 
self, attempts to slander the Russian Army and discredit all the 
great sacrifices and heroic efforts contributed by Russia to the 
Allied cause. Taking advantage of the scant familiarity of the 
general public with military matters, Ludendorf uses false data, 
cites wrong figures and consciously distorts the historic perspective 
of the War. 

It is difficult to understand how a serious-minded military 
leader can stoop to employ, in a supposedly serious work, methods 
fit for the yellow press, such as accusing Russian generals of 
treason, etc., etc. These memoirs, as a whole, were met at the 
time of their publication by sharp and adverse criticism in the 
foreign, and even the German, press. Ludendorf's memoirs 
are especially misleading in the part describing the first Rus- 
sian advance in East Prussia, the advance that played such a 
decisive role in the defeat which the Germans suffered on the 
Marne. It should never be forgotten that this event proved 
fatal and brought about the final defeat of the Germans in this 
sonov.* 

Russia's Sacrifice 

Ludendorf commences his recital of events on the Russian 
front with the statement that in 1914, in East Prussia, with a 
force of only two German corps, he destroyed 250,000 Russians 
— six army corps — under the command of General Samsonov, and 
that General Rennenkampf, who was only within two or three 
days' march from Samsonov, had designedly failed to aid Sam- 
sonov. 

This statement by General Ludendorf is absolutely false from 
beginning to end. It can be very easily proven that Ludendorf 



♦See Appendixes No. I and II, in which an analysis of this part of Ludendorf's 
Memoirs is given. 



Russia's Part in the World War 11 

attacked Samsonov not with two army corps, but with more than 
240,000 German troops. With this army he attacked not 250,000 
Russians, but only two Russian army corps, i. e., 80,000 men — 
the 1st and the 6th Russian Army Corps. Thus, Ludendorf had 
a force three times larger than his adversary. 

It may be easily seen from this that while Ludendorf gives 
Samsonov twice as many men as he had in reality, he, at the same 
time, credits Rennenkampf with three times the number he ac- 
tually had. His own force Ludendorf puts, on paper, at one- 
third of what he had in fact. 

Rennenkampf knew nothing about the events on the 
Samsonov front until August 30, whereas the latter was sur- 
rounded on August 28. (See Gurko's book, "War and Revolu- 
tion".) 

The cause of the Russian defeat in that battle was not 
the "genius" of Ludendorf, but lay rather in the fact that the 
Russian Army, in its eagerness to relieve Paris, advanced too 
quickly, with not fully mobilised and insufficient forces, and in 
two separate Armies, coupled with the difficulty of reconnoitering 
and obtaining information about the enemy in a country where 
the entire population was in a state of armed belligerency. The 
death of Samsonov and of a part of his staff and the disruption 
of liaison were other causes. * 

In her haste to aid her Allies, Russia risked much, and she lost 
a battle on account of the precariousness of the operation, insuf- 
ficiency of forces and an unfortunate accident. But she succeeded 
in diverting several German corps from France, and the Russian 
blood shed at Tannenberg thus helped win the First Battle of the 
Marne. 

It may thus be seen from the descriptions of the first bat- 
tles in East Prussia that Ludendorf, for the sake of German mar- 
tial glory and probably also for the glorification of his own role, 
makes use of a very primitive and naive expedient. He multiplies 
the number of Russian troops several times, and also diminishes 



*See Appendixes "Ludendorf-Samsonov" and "Ludendorf-Rennenkampf" at the end 
of the pamphlet. 



12 Russia's Part in the World War 

his own forces several times. This creates the impression that 
Ludendorf with "inconsiderable" forces smashed the "many times 
larger" forces of the Russians. As a matter of fact, however, 
as we have seen, Ludendorf had in these engagements, \y 2 , 2, 
and sometimes even 3 times as many men as the Russians. How 
excessive this superiority of numbers was may be inferred from 
the fact that the Germans themselves went to France with but 
\y 2 times as many men and that they considered this sufficient 
for a decisive victory over the French Army. However, no mat- 
ter how much Ludendorf may distort the facts in his memoirs, 
he cannot refrain, albeit only by 2-3 words, from mentioning 
the strategical catastrophe which overtook Germany through the 
invasion of East Prussia by the Russian troops. Ludendorf 
himself admits that "the transfer of the two army corps from 
the French front to Eastern Prussia had fatal consequences for 
Germany. The German advance on France was turned into a re- 
treat." 

This admission from Ludendorf characterizes the importance 
of all the events of the first few weeks of the War and it con- 
tains an involuntary appreciation of the historic role and self- 
sacrificing efforts of Russia. The enemy, albeit indirectly, admits 
that Russian blood was not shed in vain on the fields of East 
Prussia; it was precisely for this reason that Germany was 
unable to win the War at the only moment at which she could 
ever have won, taking advantage of Russia's unpreparedness and 
the temporary isolation of France. 

In conclusion, we must also point out that from a formal 
standpoint Russia was not bound to fling herself into a risky 
operation in East Prussia. The Russian Army, like any other 
Army, was bound to take the field actively only after the com- 
pletion of her mobilization, and this early assistance was still 
less her duty as she herself was at the time invaded by Austrian 
forces. 

But Russia regarded her alliance with France from a higher 
standpoint than mere formal obligations. The justice of History 
—not the "history" of Ludendorf — will in its own time record 



Russia's Part in the World War 13 

how far Russia stood from egotistic politics and egotistic strategy 
during those tragic days of August and September, 1914, when 
the German masses, smashing every obstacle in their path, moved 
through northern France on Paris. 

The German Defeat at Warsaw 

The battle of Ypres, the determined operations of the Ger- 
mans for the capture of Calais, is the other critical moment in 
the history of the World War, when Russia once more brought 
heavy sacrifices to the common cause of the Allies. Ludendorf, 
in describing these difficult days for the Germans, again makes 
use, we regret to say, of the same unsavory expedient he used in 
describing the first engagements in East Prussia. 

Thus, for instance, he asserts that when he was defeated 
in October, 1914, at Warsaw, the Russians had 1,200,000 
men,* while he had only one German army — the 9th — and 
one Austrian army — the 1st. As a matter of fact, the Rus- 
sians were opposed, on the entire front, by five Austrian 
armies and two German armies — the 8th and the 9th — by 
more than 70 divisions approximating about 1,200,000 men. 
The Russians, having left only a small force to oppose four Aus- 
trian armies, fell with their three armies upon two enemy armies, 
one German and one Austrian, near Warsaw. With a numerical 



♦How preposterous is this figure of 1,200,000 men, supposed to 
have been transferred by the Russians from Galicia to Warsaw, to 
oppose Ludendorf, may be seen from the fact that only 3 railway 
lines run from Galicia to Warsaw. It is not difficult to demonstrate 
that it is impossible to carry 1,200,000 men on 3 railway lines within 
2 weeks (the offensive of the Germans against Warsaw began in 
the first days of October, and the retreat began two weeks later, i. e., 
when the Russian troops were transferred from Galicia to Warsaw). 

One army corps requires 140 — 150 trains. The best road in 
Russia can at most carry 52 trains in 24 hours in one direction. 
Hence, to entrain a corps would require 3 days. Consequently the 
most that could be entrained within 15 days would be 5 corps to each 
railway line. Thus, all 3 roads combined might have been able to 
carry up to 15 corps, but actually, of course, they carried less than 
that. But even if we allow the computation of 15 corps to stand, 
we have but 500 — 600 thousand men, and not 1,200,000 as Mr. Luden- 
dorf unhesitatingly alloi.s. 



14 Russia's Part in the World War 

superiority of one and a quarter to one the Russians defeated the 
Germans, and threw them back across the whole of Poland to 
Posen. The Germans saved themselves on that occasion only 
by destroying the railroads back of them and by burning the 
bridges. 

The significance of the operations at Warsaw and in Galicia 
in October, and beyond Warsaw in November, 1914, is to be seen 
from Ludendorf's own story. Referring to a conversation he 
had with General Falkenhayn, who at that time was the main 
leader of all German Army operations, he writes in his memoirs : 
"At the end of October, 1914, General von Falkenhayn summoned 
me to Berlin. . . . Gen. von Falkenhayn spoke hopefully of the 
attack near Ypres, and wanted to defer further decisions." 

But already in the beginning of November, i. e., a few days 
after this conversation, the operations of the Russian Armies in 
Galicia, the Posen territory, and on the East Prussian front, 
greatly diminished the hopefulness of Falkenhayn and compelled 
him to slacken the pressure against the Allies at Ypres and to 
transfer large forces from France to the Russian front — to the 
detriment of the offensive against Ypres. Ludendorf himself 
figures these reinforcements which arrived from France in the 
middle of November, and, consequently, must have left there in 
the beginning of November, at 225,000 men. There were 4 corps 
with 2 infantry divisions, which Ludendorf figures at 225,000 
men. Besides, Ludendorf mentions right here the arrival of 
Richthofen's cavalry corps, Hollen's Cavalry Corps, the 2nd and 
4th Cavalry Divisions. Still earlier Ludendorf mentions that the 
newly formed 25th Reserve Corps and the 15th Reserve Corps 
were dispatched to East Prussia. And finally, in still another 
place, we can find in Ludendorf's account a number of other new 
divisions which had been sent to the Russian front instead of 
to Ypres. 

In this manner it is easy to see, from the data fur- 
nished by Ludendorf himself, that, "hopeful" at the end of 
October for the success of the attack on Ypres, Falkenhayn found 
it necessary to dispatch from France 300,000 additional soldiers 
to the Russian front, aside from the reserves taken from the 



Russia's Part in the World War 



15 




While the Russian troops were persecuting the defeated 
Austrians in Galicia, General Hindenburg began an advance 
towards Warsaw. The Russian General Staff transferred 
from Galicia three armies for the defense of Warsaw, and 
these armies defeated the two Austro-German armies and 
persecuted them through Poland up to the border of Germany 
(October, 1914). 



16 Russia's Part in the World War 

interior of Germany, which forces would also have been welcome 
to the Germans during the fateful days at Ypres. While the 
frontal attacks on Ypres, attended by considerable casualties, 
demanded the presence of large German reserves, these reserves 
were the very ones which were swallowed up entirely by the 
Russian operations in the East, at Warsaw, Galicia and East 
Prussia. 

If the firmness of the Allies held back the Germans at Ypres 
and prevented them from breaking through to Calais, the Russian 
Army also played an important part in this strategic situation — 
compelling the Germans to abandon the operation at Ypres much 
earlier than the Germans and Falkenhayn had figured. But 
not in this alone was the role of Russia apparent in the trying 
days of October and November, 1914. Not only did Russia 
force the Germans to transfer 300,000 soldiers to the East, 
and to abandon early the operations in France, but she also 
compelled the Germans, by her operations in 1914, to abandon 
for more than a year all large offensives in the West. This is 
attested not only by the facts (as is well known, from the end 
of 1914 up to February, 1916, the Germans did not start any 
offensive in France), but by Ludendorf himself, notwithstand- 
ing all his endeavors to discredit the Russian Army. 

Speaking of the weakness of the German front in the West in 
the month of November, Ludendorf says that it was perfectly 
natural "that in this situation our eyes should again turn to the 
East." . . . Further on he adds that he had asked himself 
whether it were not better "once and for all to restrict operations 
on the Western front to a defensive and to carry out the con- 
templated operations against Russia with all our available forces. 
. . . This point of view seemed to me to be the right one. 
and I asked our High Command for reinforcements from the 
West. . . ." Thus, such facts as the abandonment by the 
Germans of all operations in the West for more than a year, as 
well as Ludendorf's own words, prove with absolute clearness 
and conclusiveness that the Germans, partly through the firm- 
ness of the Allies, but mainly on account of the hard blows from 
the Russian Army, found themselves compelled for a long time 



Russia s Part in the World War 



17 




This diagram shows that the Germans had calculated, at 
first, to stop the Russian Army with the aid of the Austrian 
troops and only 14 of their own divisions — 13 infantry and 
one cavalry divisions. Soon, in September, 1914, they were 
compelled to forward 6 more divisions to the East, — during 
the Marne period. Later, when the Austrians were defeated, 
the number of German relief columns increased and num- 
bered, at the end of 1914, 43 divisions, instead of the former 
14 divisions, — three times as many. Early in 1915 the number 
of German divisions grew to 53. During 1916 and 1917 the 
number of the German troops on the Russian front was also 
increasing incessantly, at the expense of German strength on 
the French front. 



18 Russia's Part in the World War 

to refrain from an offensive in France. There is no doubt but 
that the Germans never abandoned entirely the attempt to crush 
France, for we have seen how such a serious attempt was made 
by them subsequently at Verdun. But if they were compelled at 
the end of 1914 to defer this attempt at crushing France for 
more than a year, it is obvious that the decisive part in this de- 
cision of the Germans was played by Russia, in the increasing 
offensive of her Armies all along the front from the Baltic to the 
Carpathians. 

Thus, if the taking of the Held by unprepared Russia in the 
beginning of the War contributed to the defeat of the most dan- 
gerous and main plan of the Germans, in August and September, 
the new sacrifices brought by Russia in October and November 
on the plains of Galicia, Poland and East Prussia compelled the 
Germans to desist for more than a year from all attempts to win 
the War in France. August and September, 1914, were the 
months in zvhich the German forces were brought to a standstill, 
and October and November sazv them already much impaired. 
At both important, critical moments Russia played her decisive 
part. 

At this same period, towards the close of 1914, the Germans 
were compelled by the operations of the Russian Army to in- 
crease the number of their troops on the Russian front up to 43 
divisions. If the Germans were unable in the beginning of the 
War to win out in France where they had all their forces, allot- 
ting to the Russian front only 14 divisions and the Austrian 
Army, so much the less could they have won at the end of 1914, 
when the Russians had compelled them to have 43 divisions in the 
field, that is, to treble their forces on the Russian front, to the 
detriment of their French front. 

New Opportunities for the Allies 

The third great period of the world-conflict — 1915 — is the year 
of Russia's single-handed fight against Germany, Austria and 
Turkey. This year was hardest for Russia not only because all 
attention and all efforts of the three enemy powers were directed 



Russia's Part in the World War 19 

against Russia alone, but also because in 1915 Russia was less 
than ever before prepared for the struggle — being without arms, 
shells and munitions. No matter how much Ludendorf may dis- 
tort the truth in his memoirs, the whole world knows that in that 
year the Russian positions were covered not by barbed wire en- 
tanglements, but by the naked breasts of the Russian soldiers, and 
German charges were repulsed not by artillery barrages but by 
the bayonet, by cold steel — reminding us of the times when the 
Mexicans, armed only with spears, fought against the rifles and 
cannon of the Spaniards under Fernando Cortez. 

Russia's loss of Poland in 1915 is altogether a result of this 
situation, unprecedented in any of the wars fought by European 
nations. It was hard to gain victory when the shortage of arms 
was so great that some corps counted but 1,500 bayonets instead 
of 40,000, and at the same time it was impossible to complement 
these corps with their quota of men because these men had no 
rifles. 

Russia had called millions to the colors, but had rifles only for 
one-tenth of her men. It is only too obvious that nothing could 
be accomplished with millions of men of whom only one in ten 
was armed. But in 1916, when Russia acquired rifles and artil- 
lery, Brusilov launched his memorable offensive which netted more 
than 200,000 prisoners. Another great offensive was in prepara- 
tion for 1917, but the Revolution interfered with its realization. 

However that may be, the Germans had planned to have done 
with Russia by confronting it with Austrian armies and with 
four or five additional German corps. But already in 1914 the 
Germans were compelled to keep 19 corps in the East to the 
detriment and dislocation of their plans and forces in France 
(See diagrams No. 3,4.) Even during the days of the Revolu- 
tion the Germans were obliged to maintain 78 J /2 divisions on the 
Eastern front, in addition to 47 Austrian and 15 Turkish, alto- 
gether 140 infantry and 22 cavalry divisions, while on the Anglo- 
French front the enemy had at that time only 142 divisions. If 
we take into consideration all the Russian theatres of war, includ- 
ing those in Asia, the enemy kept on the Russian fronts 164 infan- 
try divisions and 28 cavalry divisions, — altogether 192 divisions 



20 



Russia's Part in the World War 



THE NUMBER OF GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN DIVISIONS ON THE RUSSIAN 
AND OTHER ALLIED FRONTS DURJNG SPRING OF I9H 



SjS^ 162 DIVISIONS 



INFANTRY 




D 



cayalrV 



'-RUSSIAN FRONT IN ASIA - 15 OIVS. 



ON OTHER 
ALLIED 
FRONTS 



' (V 10 205 DIVISIONS 

•FRENCH- BELGIAN FRONT - |42 DIVS^TALIANFROKTS-^^Vmesopotamian 

36 OIVS. i FRONT 10 DIVS. 

SALONIKI FRONT 7 
IT DIVS 



This diagram shows that in 1917 — the beginning of the 
Russian Revolution — there were 162 German, Austrian, Turk- 
ish and Bulgarian divisions on the Russian front, 147 of whom 
were on the Russian front in Europe. On the Anglo-French 
front there were at this time only 142 German divisions. 

The enemy forces were thus divided as follows: on the 
Russian front, 44 per cent.; on the Anglo-French front, 39 
per cent.; on the Italian front, 10 per cent.; on the Salonika 
front, 4i/2 per cent., and on the Mesopotamian front — about 
Zy 2 per cent. Thus, early in 1917 the Russian Army had 
opposing it about one-half of all the forces of the Central 
Powers. 

It is clearer that if these Teutonic forces would be able to 
concentrate on the French front, it would mean an immediate 
breakdown of the Allies and the triumph of the Prussian 
militarism throughout the civilized world. 



Russia's Part in the World War 21 

(in May, 1917) while on the Anglo-French front the enemy had 
in May, 1917, only 142 divisions. 

Notwithstanding the lack of arms and munitions the Russian 
Army rendered the Allies, in the critical days of 1915, assistance 
that was not less important and serious than that of the days of 
the Marne and Ypres. Russia, by diverting upon herself, to- 
wards the close of 1914, all the efforts of the Central Powers, 
thereby offered France and England the opportunity for a whole 
year to prepare for the prosecution of the War. Throughout 
1915, when Germany, Austria and Turkey were diverted by 
Russia, France was enabled quickly to accumulate new reserves, 
munitions, shells, to recover from the serious wounds of 1914, 
and to prepare for that inevitable blow from Germany which 
subsequently took the form of a determined offensive at Verdun 
in 1916. 

At the same time England, owing to the fact that Russia had 
in 1915 taken upon herself the whole burden of the struggle, 
was enabled in the course of one year to carry out Kitchener's 
stupendous plan of expanding the small, 150 thousand-strong 
English Army of volunteers into the four million-strong Army 
of the English nation in arms. On the other hand Germany, 
having called to the colors new reserves, was compelled by Russia 
to expend these reserves on the Russian front, and not on the 
main front, in France, where the fate of the whole War was to 
be decided for Germany. 

All these opportunities, all this stupendous preparation in the 
creation and development of new armed forces by the Allies, took 
place undisturbed and in favorable circumstances, solely because 
1915 was the year of Russia's single-handed fight against three 
enemy powers, the year of the greatest self-sacrifice of the Rus- 
sian Army for the common cause. Who knows what might 
have been the result of the German offensive in France had those 
German reserves which perished in Russia broken through some- 
where in the north of France simultaneously with the storming 
of Verdun, in February. Who knows how far the German mili- 
tary catastrophe might have been averted had all the fresh re- 



22 Russia's Part in the World War 

serves of the Germans, which were being incessantly swallowed 
up by the Russian front, found themselves in the West ! 

To these questions Ludendorf himself happens to give the an- 
swers in his memoirs. Speaking of the offensive of the Germans 
at Verdun and of the offensive of the Austrians in Italy, he says : 
"Both offensives suffered from the fact that inadequate reserves 
prevented the first successes from being followed up." 

Where did these reserves, which were lacking for the capture 
of Verdun, where did they go to after Germany had in 1915 
created a great many new formations? In 1915 they were 
swallowed up by the Russian front during the German offensive 
in Poland, and the Verdun operation was frustrated because, as 
Ludendorf declares, there were no reserves with which to de- 
velop the first success of the Germans. For this reason the un- 
biased investigator will admit that Russia in 1915 contributed 
to a tremendous extent towards the calm and systematic prepara- 
tion of the Allies for the decisive German blow, struck at 
Verdun, but planned to go beyond Paris. If the firm stand of 
the French at Verdun, if the talent of Castelnau, who stopped 
the withdrawal of the French to the other bank of the Meuse, 
directly repulsed the attack of the Germans, the true ally, Russia, 
certainly aided by diverting upon herself all the German reserves 
in 1915 and giving the Allies a whole year of respite in which to 
create new armed forces. 

The Russian front incessantly drew to itself all new German 
formations and reserves, and thereby automatically forced the 
German Army in the West to carry on unproductive operations 
which never reached their objective. Not one single German 
operation in France could obtain full development, and inevitably 
spent itself just because of lack of reserves which were always 
opportunely swallowed by the Russian front. 

Turning to the operations of 1915 we see that the Germans, 
notwithstanding all their efforts and partial successes, never 
gained any decisive results on the Russian front. The Rus- 
sian Army, having neither munitions nor arms, was naturally 
unable to win at this time, and was compelled to retreat 



Russia's Part in the World War 23 

from Poland. But the Russian Army was not crushed, which, 
however, had been the main objective of Ludendorf's offensive. 

In his memoirs Ludendorf plainly states : "The German 
General Staff now resolved to try to obtain a decision against 
Russia." This, translated from military parlance into plain Eng- 
lish, simply means that it was the object to settle, to "finish" with 
Russia, in other words, to crush her Army, for otherwise 
there would have been no sense in starting operations against 
Russia, and in wasting against her the reserves so much 
needed on the main front, against France. Neither does Luden- 
dorf conceal this object further on in his memoirs, but he ad- 
mits that it was not accomplished. For this failure he blames 
General Falkenhayn, the Chief of the General Staff, who, it 
was supposed, prevented Ludendorf from crushing the 
Russian Army. We shall not enter into the personal disputes 
between Ludendorf and Falkenhayn, whom Ludendorf 
throughout criticises sharply. We shall only note that Luden- 
dorf attempted four times during the summer of 1915 to sur- 
round or break through the several retreats of the Russian 
Army, but the latter in every instance retreated in perfect 
order, carrying their arms with them. In which one of these 
four instances, then, did Falkenhayn interfere? How pre- 
posterous this shifting of the blame to Falkenhayn is, may 
be seen even from Ludendorf's own statement : "Throughout 
the whole War we never succeeded, either on the Eastern or 
Western front, in exploiting a big break-through to the full !" 
In this way he himself admits that the Germans did not even, 
once succeed, at the proper time, in utilizing a big success 
to the full, i. e., Falkenhayn's role was immaterial. It is but 
natural that the resistance of the Russians in 1915 prevented the 
Germans from exploiting that success which they regarded as a 
big one, but which, as a matter of fact, consisted only in the 
systematic retreat of the Russian Army which was without arms 
and munitions. However, the most inopportune statement made 
by Ludendorf is contained in the following remark of his con- 
cerning the operations against the Russians in 1915: "We had 
brought the final overthrow of Russia a step nearer." 



24 Russia's Part in the World War 

The offensive of Brusilov in the following year, which 
netted him more than 200,000 prisoners and made Ludendorf, 
as he himself says, frequently worry about the fate of the 
entire Austro-German front in Russia, demonstrates how the 
offensive of Ludendorf in 1915 hastened "the final overthrow 
of Russia." On the contrary, this offensive which cost Luden- 
dorf a great many of his reserves, and afforded a year of quiet 
preparation to the Allies, did, as we saw, hasten "the final over- 
throw of Germany." 

At this period of the campaign of 1915 there were on the Rus- 
sian front 67 German divisions and up to 40 Austrian, altogether 
107 divisions, and on the French front about 110 divisions. The 
Germans could not defeat the Allies in the beginning of the War, 
although they had then in France almost all their forces. It is 
natural that in 1915, when they had in France only 50 per cent, 
of their total forces, the Germans, through the efforts of Russia, 
were finally deprived of any chance of winning in France. It 
was only through Russia's military operations that the Germans 
were driven to such an unfavorable, hopeless grouping of their 
forces. 

Again Opportunities for the Allies 

In the following year, 1916, Russia once more came for- 
ward with her assistance at a critical moment, when the Aus- 
trians had broken the resistance of the Italian Armies on the 
Asiago-Arsiero front, threatening a further development of 
their offensive in the rear of the Italian Army, in the direc- 
tion of Venice. At the same time Ludendorf in his memoirs 
points out how great were the objects which the Austrians were 
aiming at on the Italian front, and he says plainly: "In Italy it 
was a question of an operation on a grand scale." 

However, the Russian Army in 1916 had no intention of 
launching an offensive on the Austrian front, and prepared for 
an offensive in an altogether different place, on the German 
front. Our General Staff had prepared for the main offensive 
in the direction of Vilna, and accordingly it was here that 



Russia's Part in the World War 25 

troops and munitions were being concentrated. (See Gurko's 
"War and Revolution.") 

Everything was ready when the Italians, crushed by the 
Austrians, appealed to Russia for aid. An offensive on the 
Austrian front held no particular interest for Russia, which 
naturally had in view the crushing of the main enemy — the 
Germans. Still, Russia, just as on previous occasions, did 
not hesitate a minute to help her Allies. Notwithstanding 
that nothing had been prepared for such an offensive, General 
Brusilov launched it along a front two hundred miles long, 
with the troops he just happened to have on the spot. Every- 
body remembers this celebrated offensive of Brusilov, which 
netted hundreds of thousands of prisoners, a great number 
of other trophies, and which compelled the Austrians to im- 
mediately abandon their offensive in Italy and to begin the 
transfer of troops to the Russian front. "Austria gradually 
broke off the Italian offensive and sent troops to the Eastern 
front," writes Ludendorf. "The Italian Army now started a 
counter-offensive in the Tyrol," he remarks further on. 

Describing the period of Brusilov's offensive, Ludendorf 
does not conceal the fact that they passed through some very 
bad and critical moments. "Our G. H. Q. made heavy de- 
mands on both groups (group south of Riga and Prince 
Leopold group) and also withdrew divisions from the West, 1 ' 
writes Ludendorf. "Even all the fresh divisions that were 
thrown in were hardly sufficient to hold the front," says he 
in describing the situation of the Austro-Germans after the 
Russian break through at the Dniester. "This was one of 
the greatest crises on the Eastern front," says he further on, 
in speaking of the new break by Brusilov at Lutzk. 

The effects of Brusilov's offensive proved to be so far- 
reaching as to affect not only the situation on the Italian front 
but also that on the French main front. The Allies, in view 
of the difficult situation of the Germans on the Russian front, 
launched an offensive at the Somme, and towards fall they 
had finally cleared the forts of Verdun of the Germans. 



26 Russia's Part in the World War 

So did Russia once more fulfill her obligation towards her 
allies, as soon as her Army had received some quantity of 
munitions. This quantity was not yet sufficient in 1916, and 
it was only in 1917 that the Russian troops were at last more 
or less provided. The lack of munitions during the period 
of Brusilov's offensive was pointed out by the Russian Staff, 
and Ludendorf himself emphasizes it. He writes that the 
situation was relieved thanks to the fact that "the Russians 
were also contending against extraordinary difficulty of sup- 
ply." From this it may be seen that the Russian Army, hav- 
ing obtained only the first consignments of inconsiderable and 
insufficient munitions, did not hesitate, in 1916, to offer her 
allies generous assistance on the largest scale. 



Still earlier, during the Verdun period, the Russian Army, not 
yet recuperated from the hard blows of 1915, did by no means 
stand by as an idle onlooker of the heroic efforts of the French at 
Verdun. When at the end of February, 1916, French Head- 
quarters appealed to the Russian Army for assistance, prepara- 
tions were begun for an offensive. "The Russian Army had not 
lost its spirit after the heavy fighting of 1915," says Ludendorf. 
On the 16th of March operations were begun by the Russian 
troops in the territory to the northwest of Dvinsk, continu- 
ing until the 26th of March. This partial offensive, solely in 
aid of the French, was attended by success of a local nature. 
Ludendorf criticises this operation and says that "it was 
choked in swamps and blood." Of course, the terrible 
weather conditions, the rains and the impassable roads, inter- 
fered with a broad development of this offensive, but still it 
had a sufficiently serious effect. "From the 11th to the 21st 
of March," acknowledges Ludendorf, "the situation of the 
10th (German) army was critical." 

Salvation of Roumania 

At the close of 1916 the Russian Army again had to offer 
most effective assistance at the critical moment of Macken- 
sen's and Falkenhayn's invasion of Roumania. General Alex- 



Russia's Part in the World War 




This map shows the four places in which the Russian 
Army, led by Gen. Brussiloff, broke through the Austro- 
German front in the summer of 1916. 



28 Russia's Part in the World War 

eiev pointed out to the Roumanian High Command the ex- 
cessive length of the Roumanian frontier line which rendered 
operations in the border district difficult for the small Rou- 
manian Army. General Alexeiev, as well as the Allied mili- 
tary experts, advised the Roumanians to shorten their front 
line, by means of a retreat, to a shorter line in the East which 
could be held by the comparatively small Roumanian Army. 
But the Roumanians, calculating upon a weakening of the 
Austrians, preferred to choose a new plan and invaded vast 
Transylvania. 

This too daring move, which at first met but feeble resist- 
ance, was, however, soon checked by the enemy. When 
thereupon the enemy himself took the offensive and invaded 
Roumania and began to threaten Bucharest, the Roumanian 
representative at Russian headquarters, General Coanda, appealed 
to Russia for aid. 

The Russian Army had not yet succeeded in recuperating 
from the effects of its great summer offensive of 1916. Rus- 
sia's reserves and supplies had been to a considerable extent 
spent during the period of Brusilov's offensive. Nevertheless 
Russia, again as always, did not hesitate for one minute to 
come to the assistance of the Allies. The Russians even 
proposed to take upon themselves the defense of the Rou- 
manian capital — Bucharest — but this offer was turned down 
by the Roumanians with some show of embarrassment; they 
pointed out that the railroads leading to Bucharest were 
blocked with evacuated freights from the capital and could 
not therefore carry the Russian troops. Probably certain 
political considerations played not a small part in this. 

However that might be, Russia did not refuse her aid in the 
form desired by the Roumanians. From the long Russian 
front which, in turn, stood in need of reserves, troops were 
taken off and sent to Roumania. Two armies, under Letchitzki 
and Sakharov, and the great mass of cavalry under Manner- 
heim, were assigned by the Russians to assist the retreating 
Roumanians. This effective help by Russia achieved its 



Russia's Part in the World War 29 

purpose, stopping the offensive of the enemy, and towards 
1917 the Russian Armies also took upon themselves the none 
too easy task of defending the greater part of the Roumanian 
front. 

For the following year, 1917, Russia prepared for a decisive 
offensive on the German front, in common with the Allies. 
That was the first year that the Russian Army had at last 
obtained sufficient armaments and supplies. The Germans 
realized that most serious danger threatened them, and the 
Germano-Bolshevist provocation was now chosen as the 
means of disarming Russia. And yet, even during those ter- 
rible days of the collapse of the Russian Army and the Revo- 
lution, Russia was indispensable to the Allies. 

During those revolutionary days of 1917 Russia compelled 
the enemy to maintain on the Russian front 162 divisions of 
German, Austrian, Turkish and Bulgarian troops, to the enemy's 
detriment on the French main front. On this front the enemy 
was enabled to maintain only 140 divisions. 

Russia, although sapped by the Germano-Bolshevist con- 
spiracy, was still formidable, and the enemy did not risk the 
moving of any of his troops from the Russian front. Russia 
was growing faint, but that honest Russia which had saved her 
allies in East Prussia, Galicia, on the fields of Poland, Lithuania, 
Roumania, in the Caucasus and Armenia, did not lay down 
her arms to the very last moment, remaining true to her 
obligations. 

Russia's Losses — 12,000,000 

From this brief outline one can readily see what great and 
numerous objects Russia accomplished in the World War, 
and how important was her role in that final collapse of the 
Central Powers at which the Allies had been aiming in the 
four-year long struggle. In full accord with these efforts 
are the extraordinary sacrifices brought by Russia, sacrifices 
in men, sacrifices in material resources and money, and final- 
ly, that great upheaval through which the Russian people 



30 Russia's Part in the World War 

are now passing, as a result of their over-exertion in the 
years of the World War. 

Among these sacrifices, Russia's losses in men run into 
such great numbers that the immense, extraordinary part 
played by Russia becomes at once obvious to anyone. 

Of the many different figures quoted by various investi- 
gators the most reliable are undoubtedly those furnished by 
the official statistics of the Russian Army Staff. 

Among these figures made public in the press the most im- 
portant are those given by the Staff of the Commander-in- 
Chief of the Russian Army, pertaining to the year 1916, con- 
cerning the total number of mobilized soldiers and the number 
of those still in the service. According to this information, the 
Russian War Ministry called to the colors from the outbreak 
of the War up to the winter of 1916 more than 14 million men; 
but the commissary department of the Army had towards the 
close of 1916 less than 10 million on its rolls. The difference 
of 4y 2 million between these two figures constituted the abso- 
lute losses of the Army during 3 campaigns (1914, 15, 16). 
This gave the Staff the basis for calculating the yearly aver- 
age total losses at \ J / 2 million men. Adding, accordingly, \y 2 
million losses for 1917, we obtain 6 million total losses during 
the whole War. 

But these are only the men who were a total loss to the 
Army, i. e., the losses in killed and prisoners, without the 
wounded, except a moderate number of crippled who were no 
longer fit for service at the front nor for service out of the ranks, 
and who therefore had to be discharged from the Army entirely. 

The total number of Russian war-prisoners towards the 
end of the War, according to figures compiled by the Russian 
Commission on War Prisoners, amounted to about 2 J / 2 million. 
Deducting this number from 6 million, we obtain Z z / 2 million 
in killed and the small number of crippled who were discharged 
entirely. 

This number, 2> l / 2 million, obtained from official statistics, 
is the basis of our calculations. The percentage of disabled 
was comparatively small. German statistics during the War 



Russia's Part in the World War 31 

figured it to be 10 per cent. Hence the figure of 3^4 million 
must comprize only a little less than 3 million in killed alone. 
The number of wounded is usually approximately 2^4 times 
the number of killed.* Multiplying the number of wounded not 
by 2%, but only by 2, we obtain about 6 million wounded. 
Thus we have a total of 6 million killed and prisoners, and 6 
million wounded, or a grand total of not less than 12 million 
losses for Russia, in killed, wounded and prisoners. 

These figures are rather minimized, for we have above 
underestimated the number of wounded. These figures, based 
upon official statistics, agree with those arrived at by the 
"Copenhagen Society for Studying the Consequences of the 
War." This society estimates the losses at 9^4 million, exclu- 
sive of prisoners. As we have shown above, there were 2}4 
million prisoners. 

Thus there can be no doubt but that the number of Russian 
casualties was not less than 12,000,000, of which there were 
3,000,000 in killed. 

These losses are almost equal to the combined losses of our 
Allies.** 

Russia's losses are more than twice those of France, 4 — 5 
times those of England, and more than 35 times those of 
America. These losses are more than twice the total strength 
of the British Army, and 3 — 4 times all the forces mustered 
by the United States. This number of casualties alone is 
larger than the total population of any of the following 
European countries : Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Portugal, 
Belgium, Holland, or the Balkan States ! 

Thus do simple figures tell us clearly and plainly that Russia 
sacrificed in the common cause of the Allies the greatest num- 
ber of victims and that she ranks first in the sad roster of 
Allied casualties. 



•According to figures submitted in 1916 by the army committee of the German 
Reichstag, the German army lost during the first 12 months of the War 604 thousand 
killed, 1,556,000 wounded, and 317 thousand prisoners. This shows that the number 
of wounded is Z 1 /^ times the number of killed. 

•♦According to the statistics of the "Copenhagen Society," the French Army lost 
1,350.000 in killed, the British— 700,000, the Italian — 330,000, and each of the remain- 
ing Allies — 100,000 and less. 



32 



Russia's Part in the World War 



3,000000 

2,900,000 

2AO0.00Op 

2.700JOOO 

2,600,000 

2500000 

2400,000 

2,500,000 

2,200,000 

ai 00,000 

2000.000 
1.900,000 
1.800,000 
1,700.000 
1,600,000 
1.500,000 
1.400,000 
1,300,000 
1,200,000 
1.100,000 
1.000,000 

900,000 \ 

800,000 £ 

700,000^ 

fcOO.OOO 

500,000 

400,000 

300,000 

200,000 




Russia's Part in the World War 33 



Conclusion 

From this brief outline may be seen how tremendous and 
important a role was played by Russia in the world conflict. 
Summing up the general facts cited above, we arrive at the 
following definite conclusions : 

1.) Russia's role in the World War was bound to be very 
serious and important for this reason alone, that the par- 
ticipation of a nation numbering 180 million souls could not 
fail to be significant in itself, and was therefore bound to 
exercise a tremendous influence upon the outcome of the 
World War. 

2.) Accordingly, Russia's role became apparent even at 
the very beginning of the War, in the important aid she 
rendered in frustrating the initial and most dangerous plan 
of the Germans, by her early offensive in aid of the Allies. 
Russia, having diverted against herself the entire Austrian 
army and part of the German, at the time of the battle on 
the Marne, through her offensive in East Prussia and Galicia, 
deprived the enemy of the opportunity to realize the funda- 
mental idea of Moltke's plan to fling "all forces into France." 
The enemy, having contrary to his plan moved on France 
with only a part of his forces, inevitably suffered defeat. 
This cooperation on the part of Russia was of tremendous 
significance, for the Germans based their plan on the idea 
that they would at first have to deal only with France alone, 
on one front only, whereas Russia compelled them at once to 
start the War on two fronts, both with Russia and France. This 
made the initial German war plan useless because strategy says 
plainly: "Errors in the strategic deploying of forces in the begin- 
ning of a war have a decisive influence and cannot be rectified 
until the war is over." From this rule of strategy it is plain that 
Russia's operations in the beginning of the war at the outset 
condemned Germany to lose the war. 

3.) At the following attempt of the enemy to find a decision 
in France, to break through to Calais, at Ypres, Russia, by 



34 Russia's Part in the World War 

the blows she delivered in Galicia, at Warsaw and in East 
Prussia, contributed to the early termination of this second 
offensive in France, so dangerous to England, and compelled the 
Germans for more than a year to abstain from their main opera- 
tions on the main decisive front of the War — in France. 

4.) In 1915 Russia, having shouldered alone the whole bur- 
den of the struggle against Germany, Austria and Turkey, 
although forced to abandon Poland, still gave the Allies the 
opportunity to prepare throughout a whole year for the 
coming German offensive at Verdun. At the same time, 
having compelled the Germans during 1915 to spend all their 
fresh formations and reserves on the Russian front, Russia 
thereby deprived the Germans of the reserves they needed 
for Verdun and their other operations in France. 

5.) In 1916 Russia, thanks to the Brusilov offensive, saved 
Italy at that critical moment when the Austrians, through 
their successful offensive from Tyrol in the rear of the 
Italians, threatened to cut off a considerable portion of the 
Italian Army, at the same time menacing Venice. Together 
with this, Russia by this offensive greatly facilitated the 
operations of the Allies on the Somme, and was instrumental 
in the final clearing of the Verdun forts. 

6.) In 1916 Russia took upon herself the blows of Macken- 
sen's and Falkenhayn's armies which had invaded Roumania, 
stopped the further advance of the Germans, and undertook 
the defense of a considerable stretch of the Roumanian front. 

7.) Through a period of three years of struggle against 
Germany, Austria and Turkey, Russia, having diverted the 
forces of the enemy, afforded the Allies a long period of 
quiet for the preparation and strengthening of the Allied 
Armies and for the systematic creation of a new 4 million 
British Army. 

8.) Throughout this period of three years of struggle 
Russia compelled the enemy to spend on the Russian front such 
a stupendous amount of force, reserves and munitions as to 



Russia's Part in the World War 35 



hasten the inevitable fall of the enemy, and this immensely facili- 
tated the delivery of the final, decisive blows by the Allies. 

9.) Russia, incessantly drawing upon herself the forces of 
the enemy, did not give him the opportunity for one minute 
from the very beginning of the War to gather sufficient force 
for a decisive blow on the main, decisive front — in France. 
The role of Russia, therefore, was clearly apparent in the 
fact that she deprived Germany throughout the War of the pos- 
sibility to win and rendered futile every effort of the enemy in 
this respect. 

10.) Corresponding with the most important role that Rus- 
sia played in the War are her enormous sacrifices in men, 
material and treasure. Her losses in men, amounting to 12,- 
000,000, exceed several times the casualties of any of the Allies ; 
are almost equal to the losses of all the Allies combined; exceed 
several times the total number of men mobilized by any one of 
the Allies. . 

11.) Russia's role in the recent war was so important and ex- 
traordinary that without Russia the very idea of a struggle with 
German militarism would have been impossible. Germany would 
have been able to crush any combination of the European 
Powers if Russia had not participated in such combination. 
Were it not for Russia, Germany would now dominate not 
only Europe, but probably the rest of the world as well. 

12.) Russia's great role in the World War is so much 
the greater since she fought under extraordinary circum- 
stances, lacking so indispensable an asset as a great network 
of railways, with a backward technique, industry, etc. In 
the hard first years of the War the Russian Armies, as we 
have seen, in extraordinary circumstances and frequently 
without arms and munitions, did everything possible, and, 
together with failures, had also their successes. 

Ludendorf was able to achieve success on the Russian front 
only when the Germans outnumbered their adversaries by at 
least three to two. At Tannenberg the Germans had twice 



36 Russia's Part in the World War 

as many and, at certain stages, even three times as many men 
as the Russians. Against Rennenkampf Ludendorf had three 
men to every two of his enemy, and probably even as many as 
two to one, as Rennenkampf had suffered severe losses during 
the preceding days. 

It is equally true that the Russians were able to defeat the 
Germans whenever they had even a small superiority of force. 
Near Warsaw the Russians had less than five men to every 
four Germans and they succeeded in defeating the latter and 
throwing them clear across all Poland. 

It may seem strange that the Germans should have man- 
aged to have numerical superiority over the Russians all the 
time. Regrettable as it may be, it is nevertheless true, for the 
strength of an army is determined not by the number of its 
men, but by the number of bayonets (infantry), sabres (cav- 
alry) and guns (artillery). The Russian Army consisted of 
millions, but bayonets and guns it had only for one-tenth of 
its number. In 1915 some Russian divisions numbered, in- 
stead of 20,000 bayonets, only a mere thousand, owing to 
disastrous losses. The only employment of infantry during 
those days was as a screen for the artillery, while the latter 
was quite useless for fighting purposes because it had no 
ammunition whatever. Under such conditions many of our 
corps often did not exceed the strength of a single regiment 
and some armies numbered no more effectives than a single 
division. We had plenty of men, but no arms and ammuni- 
tion. Therefore, the Germans frequently surpassed us not in 
men, but in bayonets and guns. 

The tragedy of the Russian situation lay in the cruel fact 
that Russia, while only one-tenth of her Armies were armed, 
was facing Germany and Austria, who were armed from head 
to foot. Not Ludendorf and not his ordinary military skill 
were the causes of Russia's failures in the first year of the 
War, but that simple and terrible truth which Brusilov once 
expressed in the following words: "The Russians had no shells 
with which to blast their way across barbed-wire entanglements 



Russia's Part in the World War 



37 




MILES 
50 WO 150 200 

J I I I 



DVINSK 



<hm 



MINSK 



tMOGHILEV 



BREST- 
LITOVSK 



} -t r 'Pef 



KOYEL 






v.. 



f«LUZK 



/- LEMBERG 

V 

TSTANISLAVOV' 



RODY 



(fpol 



BERDITCHEV 



S 



^ 



flO^TX 



^ 



**•• 



tfAZZY 



" v — J ^ 

R 9 ° 

BUKHAREST 




.DNSTANZA 





The black line represents the Russian front in 1917. The 
front stretched from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. The 
Roumanian front was held also primarily by Russian troops. 



38 Russia's Part in the World War 

before an attack; so it became necessary for them to break dozvn 
the wires with the bodies of Russian soldiers, and to form a 
bridge across these dead bodies for the next attacking column." 

We have concluded our sketch of Russia's participation in 
the World War with 1917. But 1918 also has its stcry: in 
that year Russia was denied a voice at the conference on that 
peace in the name of which Russia had ottered up so many 
sacrifices and made such efforts. 

We have seen how important and essential a part Russia 
played in the overthrow of German militarism. Russia's tre- 
mendous role confirms once more the elementary truth that in 
the future also Russia will inevitably be a colossal factor of 
political and military equilibrium in Europe. Whatever does 
happen to Russia, however they may dismember her living body, 
the immense Russian nation, with 125 million souls of pure Rus- 
sian blood alone, will always remain that heavy military weight 
which inevitably lowers that particular scale upon which it 
descends. 

It is true, Germany is now crushed and enfeebled. But we 
know that victorious countries are now suffering not less, and 
some of them even more, from the consequences of the most 
stupendous world conflict. 

Years will pass, and possibly but a few years, and again the 
world will recuperate. We have no reason to expect that the 
active German people will lag behind the rest in this work 
of reestablishing normal conditions of life and labor. 

The Treaty of Versailles has not solved a good many prob- 
lems, and among them also those that were the cause of the 
World War. Notwithstanding all partitioning, Germany still 
retains up to 60 million souls, but France only a little more 
than 40 million. The population of Germany has always been 
growing, while that of France, if it has not decreased, has 
not increased. After all, Germany has and will have a numerical 
superiority over France of one and a half times. 

France, well aware of that, tries to maintain an alliance with 
England, and reckons upon the aid of America. But the 



Russia's Part in the World War 39 

statesmen of the West realize how insufficient all this is, for 
they still remember well that first critical month of the War 
when France was all alone and saved herself only through 
extraordinary efforts. 

Until the United States arrives on the scene! Why, that 
inevitably means months and months of waiting. Until the 
British Army is mobilized and transported! Why, we know 
how difficult and tedious are the conditions of embarkation 
and landing of troops, artillery, transport columns, munitions, 
etc. We know that the 150,000 soldiers of the British Army 
alone required, in August, 1914, more than three weeks for dis- 
embarkation. And where? In three ports where everything 
was equipped for disembarkation purposes, where ideal con- 
ditions prevailed such as were hard to find in any other 
ports. 

Thus France, in the event of a new conflict with her old 
foe, will again find herself for quite some time left all alone 
to face the numerically superior enemy. Where will Russia 
be then? 

No Poland, no combination of any group of small States 
will be able to take the place of Russia, for that would be a 
mere 15-20 millions; it will be not Russia, but only one- 
seventh, a sixth, or fifth part of that which Russia gave 
during the past War. These weak nations will only become 
additional trophies to the enemy, just as Roumania, Serbia 
and Belgium became his easy prey in the past War. 

Where will Russia be then? Not the present-day Russia 
bleeding to death in its struggle against Bolshevism, but 
the future, once more powerful, Russia? . . . 

Bolshevism, an abnormal phenomenon, is bound to come 
to an end — somewhat earlier, or somewhat later. No 
matter how much may be cut off from Russia, she will 
always remain an immense, great, rich, and therefore power- 
ful, country. Too much will depend upon what this coming 



40 Russia's Part in the World War 

Russia may have to say, for any sensible statesman to refuse 
to reckon with that eventuality. 

This question the statesmen of the West must ask of 
themselves clearly and plainly — not those statesmen who 
think no further than the following day and of the success 
of their fight against their political opponents — but those wise 
leaders of the nations who really have at heart the interests 
of their own countries, as well as of the entire civilized 
world. "Ostrich politics" may least of all be applied in 
dealing with that tremendous military and political factor 
which covers one-sixth of the land surface of the globe and 
is called Russia. 



Appendix No. I 

Ludendorf — Samsonov 

1.) A careful perusal of Ludendorf 's memoirs brings out the 
fact that during the first Russian invasion of Eastern Prussia 
there participated on the German side: the 1st, 17th, 20th and 
1st Reserve Corps, the 3rd Reserve Division, the 6th Land- 
wehr Brigade, Goltz's Division, the garrisons of the Vistula 
fortresses, — Thorn, Kulm and Graudenitz, and a brigade of 
cavalry. The German forces consisted,- therefore, not of two 
corps numbering 80,000 men but of more than 240,000, not count- 
ing the masses of landsturm, which fact Ludendorf carefully 
conceals. 

2.) The Russians, on the other hand, advanced into East Prus- 
sia not fully mobilized, as this battle took place twenty-seven 
days after the War was declared, and the Russian mobilization 
was only completed three — four weeks later. Samsonov had no 
six army corps under his command, but only 4 corps: the 1st, the 
6th, the 13th and the 15th, and, figuring even at 40,000 men per 
army corps, this force could not have exceeded 160,000 men. 

3.) It can be seen, therefore, that in this battle over 240,000 
Germans were opposing 160,000 Russians at most. However, as 
a matter of positive fact, the attack of the 240,000 Germans was 
directed against two Russian corps only, the 1st and the 6th, 
i. e., at only approximately 80,000 men. 

4.) A force of Germans, three times as strong, overpowered two 
Russian corps. During that attack Samsonov and a part of his 
staff were killed. That, and the disruption of liaison, was the 
reason reinforcements were not sent up from the other corps and 
the Germans succeeded in invading the Russian rear (see map 
No. 1). 

5.) The remainder of Samsonov's army, about 80,000 men, be- 
came surrounded by 240,000 Germans, and, left without leader- 
ship, in the midst of an extremely critical and dangerous opera- 
tion, on unfamiliar territory, it was shattered. Only under such 



42 



Russia's Part in the World War 




The Russian troops are indicated on this map by white 
squares; the Germans — by black. It can be seen from this 
map that the army of Gen. Samsonov took up positions from 
Usdau to Biskofsburg. The Germans attacked his flanks, 
i. e., Usdau, his left flank, and Biskofsburg, his right. The 
1st and 6th Russian Corps were located there, as indicated 
by the map. 

It may be observed from the map that the 1st Corps was 
attacked by two German corps, one division and the Vistula 
garrisons, i. e., about 120,000 Germans attacked 40,000 Rus- 
sians. The 6th Corps at Biskofsburg was put in a similar 
situation. Under pressure from a threefold stronger German 
force, the 1st and 6th Corps retreated. Thereupon the Ger- 
mans fell under Neiderborg and Passenheim upon the rear of 
Samsonov's remaining troops, the 13th and 15th Corps. These 
corps were consequently surrounded by this threefold stronger 
force and were defeated after a heroic fight of three days. 



Russia's Part in the World War 43 

an unfortunate combination of circumstances could a threefold 
strong German force win the battle in a tactical sense. But, from 
the strategic point of view, the Germans lost in this stage of their 
campaign, as this battle diverted a number of German corps from 
France and served a purpose of the greatest importance. 

6.) It must be added that the entire population of East Prussia 
was armed, and scouting was very difficult. The Russians knew 
nothing about the enemy, while the latter was fully informed by 
the inhabitants concerning the Russians and knew every step 
these were making. That is why the German attack came as a 
surprise. 

7.) The assertion that Rennenkampf had 400,000 men and in- 
tentionally did not come to Samsonov's aid is a downright mis- 
statement. This can be seen from the fact that the battle, which 
was begun on August 27, was lost in 18 hours, on the morning of 
August 28, and Rennenkampf, who with small forces was within 
three days' marching distance from Samsonov — 40 miles — could 
not have arrived in time, particularly when we consider that he 
had to overcome on his way fortifications and barbed-wire de- 
fenses manned by landsturm and by cavalry. 

8.) Ludendorf's assertion that Rennenkampf s force consisted 
of 24 divisions, almost 400,000 men, is an obvious falsehood. A 
single army is never made up of more than six army corps, for 
facility and expediency in commanding, and this is a basic rule in 
military organizations. Ludendorf knows this very well, but it 
appears that he consciously misstated the truth in this case as 
well. 

9.) In reality Rennenkampf s army consisted of eight divisions 
or four army corps, — the 2nd, the 3rd, the 4th and the 20th, and 
of six cavalry divisions. Altogether his force consisted of about 
160,000 men. The bulk of his infantry could not have reached 
the front at that time, as it was necessary to organize the rear and 
to coordinate the railway movement in Prussia, as the Russian rail 
gauge is much wider than that adopted by the German railway 
system. Rennenkampf s front, therefore, was occupied largely 



44 Russia's Part in the World War 

by cavalry, supported only in section by weak detachments of 
infantry. 

10.) Rennenkampf could not have aided Samsonov even if he 
had known his situation, because he was already at a distance of 
90 miles from his own railway lines, and Ludendorf himself ad- 
mits that it is not possible to operate safely further than 80 
miles from one's railroads. Rennenkampf's army, therefore, 
without provisions and ammunition, had to wait until its rear was 
made secure and was unable to move further. 



Appendix No. II. 

Ludendorf — Rennenkampf 



His second battle — with Rennenkampf — Ludendorf describes 
with a similar distortion of facts. On this occasion he goes so 
far as to assert that Rennekampf had not 400,000 men but 600,- 
000, and he states at the same time that Renenkampf was a 
traitor because he retreated too soon. As we have already seen, 
Rennenkampf had only about 160,000 men, and he was reinforced 
by one more corps, the 22nd, — about 40,000 additional men; 
therefore his army could not have exceeded 200,000 men. Lud- 
endorf places his own army at 300,000 men, much less, of course, 
than his actual strength, but even at that rate he attacked 200,- 
000 Russians with 300,000 German troops, outnumbering his 
adversary one and a half times. 

That accounts for the ease with which Ludendorf was able to 
throw 200,000 men into the frontal attack and still was able to 
send up 100,000 men to get into Renenkampf's' rear (see map 
No. 2). Rennenkampf 's troops were kept engaged for seven 
days in repulsing Ludendorf's attacks upon their front, and he 
had no troops left with which to parry the attack on his rear. 
When the Germans invaded the Russian rear and were threaten- 
ing to cut off the Russian main line of retreat, the Vershbolovo- 
Kovno Railroad, Rennekampf was compelled to retreat so as 
not to be cut off. In fact, had Rennenkampf not retreated at 
that time, he would have committed the same act of treason that 
Marshal Bazaine was guilty of in 1870, when he, under similar 
circumstances, did not consent to escape from the steadily clos- 
ing-up iron ring of Germans and was finally captured with his 
entire army. Rennenkampf gave orders to retreat only when 
the Germans were firing at the city of Gumbinnen and at his 
rear railway lines. This was not too soon by any means, but 
may have been rather a little late. 



46 



Russia's Part in the World War 




\7 

TILSIT 



KOVNO 



; 



wrbaubj 



^A AS? 

ill! 

fROniNTEN) 



22M.o CORPS 
(RUSSIAN 

REINFORCEMENTS) 



AND 
OOLTZ'S DIVISION 



/ 



Rennenkampf's troops are indicated between Welau and 
Ingenburg (white square). Opposite them is the German 
army (black square). 

Rennenkampf had 4 corps, — less than 160,000 men. He 
was atacked frontally also by 4 corps which engaged all his 
effectives. Meanwhile two German corps (the 17th and the 1st) 
that remained free began invading his rear (these corps are 
indicated in black). When these two corps approached 
Gumbinnen, they found themselves in a position to cut Ren- 
nenkampf off fro mhis only road, the Insterburg-Kovno rail- 
way. Rennenkampf had no men to oppose these troops with, 
as all his units were fighting at the front line of Welau- 
Ingenburg. Rennenkampf was therefore compelled to retreat 
in order not to be cut off. 



Russia's Part in the World War 47 



The 22nd Corps did not even succeed in getting near Rennen- 
kampf, and was halted by the Germans fifty miles away from the 
field of battle. Rennekampf had, therefore, not 200,000 men to 
Germany's 300,000, but only 160,000,— about one-half. The 
cause of the defeat of Rennenkampf was that that military oper- 
ation had been calculated for the combined armies of Samsonov 
and Rennenkampf, and was a risky undertaking at that. When 
Rennenkampf was left alone, this operation was as a matter of 
course doomed to defeat, and it required the tenacity of Rennen- 
kampf to have offered the obstinate resistance that he did in 
this battle. 



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